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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are
requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other
formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the
preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 91-7749
--------
JOSE ANTONIO ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ,
PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ____
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT
[March 8, 1993]
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In United States v. Holmes, 680 F. 2d 1372, 1373 (1982), cert. denied, 460 _____________ ______
U. S. 1015 (1983), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that "a
defendant who flees after conviction, but before sentencing, waives his right to
appeal from the conviction unless he can establish that his absence was due to
matters completely beyond his control." Relying on that authority, and without
further explanation, the court dismissed petitioner's
appeal. (Ftnote. 1) Because we have not previously considered whether a (Ftnote. 1)
defendant may be deemed to forfeit his right to appeal by fleeing while his case
is pending in the district court, though he is recaptured before sentencing and
appeal, we granted certiorari. 504 U. S. ___ (1992).
I
In the early evening of November 7, 1988, a Customs
____________________
1) The Court of Appeals order merely stated that the Government's "motion 1)
to dismiss is GRANTED," without actually citing Holmes. App. 78. Because the ______
Government's motion to dismiss, id., at 68-71, relied entirely on Holmes and on ___ ______
United States v. London, 723 F. 2d 1538 (CA 11), cert. denied, 467 U. S. 1228_____________ ______
(1984), which followed Holmes, we construe the Court of Appeals order as a ______
routine application of the Holmes rule. ______ 91-7749 - OPINION
2 ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES ____
Service pilot was patrolling the Cay Sal Bank area, located midway between Cuba
and the Florida Keys. Approximately 30 miles southwest of Cay Sal, the pilot
observed a low-flying aircraft circling over a white boat and dropping bales.
The boat, described by the pilot as 40 to 50 feet in length, was circling with
the plane and retrieving the bales from the water as they dropped. Because the
Customs Service plane was flying at an altitude of 2,500 feet, and visibility
was less than optimal, the pilot was unable to identify the name of the boat.
United States v. Mieres-Borges, 919 F. 2d 652, 654-655 (CA11 1990), cert._____________ _____________
denied, 499 U. S. ___ (1991); Report and Recommendation in United States v. _____________
Ortega-Rodriguez, No. 88-10035-CR-KING (SD Fla., Feb. 23, 1989).________________
The following morning, another Customs Service pilot found the Wilfred, a boat _______
resembling the one spotted approximately 12 hours earlier. This boat, located
just off the beach of Cay Sal, was described as a 30- to 40-foot sport-fishing
vessel. Upon making this discovery, the pilot first flew to the drop point
identified the night before, 30 miles away, and found no activity. Returning to
Cay Sal, he found a number of bales stacked on the beach, and the Wilfred _______
underway and headed toward Cuba.
The pilot alerted the captain of a Coast Guard cutter, who intercepted,
boarded, and searched the Wilfred. He found no narcotics, weapons, or other
incriminating evidence on the boat. Nevertheless, the three members of the crew
failed to convince the Coast Guard that they were fishing for dolphin, although
a large number of similar vessels frequently do so in the area. Mieres-Borges, _____________
919 F. 2d, at 655-657, 659-660.
Petitioner is one of the three crew members arrested, tried, and convicted of
possession with intent to distribute, and conspiring to possess with intent to
distribute, over five kilograms of cocaine. After the trial, the District Court
set June 15, 1989, as the date for sentencing. Petitioner did not appear and
was sentenced in absentia ___________ 91-7749 - OPINION
ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES 3 ____
to a prison term of 19 years and 7 months, to be followed by 5 years of
supervised release. (Ftnote. 2) Though petitioner's codefendants appealed their (Ftnote. 2)
convictions and sentences, no appeal from the judgment was filed on petitioner's
behalf.
The District Court issued a warrant for petitioner's arrest, and 11 months
later, on May 24, 1990, he was apprehended. Petitioner was indicted and found
guilty of contempt of court (Ftnote. 3) and failure to (Ftnote. 3)
appear. (Ftnote. 4) Pursuant to (Ftnote. 4)
____________________
2) No. 88-10035-CR-KING (SD Fla., June 23, 1989). 2)
3) Title 18 U. S. C. S401(3) provides: "A court of the United States shall 3)
have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt
of its authority, and none other, as . . . [d]isobedience or resistance to its
lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command."
4) Title 18 U. S. C. S3146 provides, in relevant part: 4)
"(a) OFFENSE. - Whoever, having been released under this chapter knowingly -
"(1) fails to appear before a court as required by the conditions of release;
or
"(2) fails to surrender for service of sentence pursuant to a court order;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
"(b) Punishment. - (1) The punishment for an offense under this section is -
"(A) if the person was released in connection with a charge of, or while
awaiting sentence, surrender for service of sentence, or appeal or certiorari
after conviction for -
"(i) an offense punishable by death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for a
term of 15 years or more, a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more
than ten years, or both;
"(ii) an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of five years or more,
a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both;
"(iii) any other felony, a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more
than two years, or both; or
"(iv) a misdemeanor, a fine under this chapter or imprisonment for not more
than one year, or both; and
"(B) if the person was released for appearance as a material witness, a fine
under this chapter or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
"(2) A term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall be consecutive
to the sentence of imprisonment for any other offense.
"(c) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. - It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution
under this section that uncontrollable circumstances prevented the person from
appearing or surrendering, and that the person did not contribute to the
creation of such circumstances in reckless disregard of the requirement to
appear or surrender, and that the person appeared or surrendered as soon as such
circumstances ceased to exist." 91-7749 - OPINION
4 ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES ____
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U. S. C. S3551 et seq., the District Court _______
imposed a prison sentence of 21 months, to be served after the completion of the
sentence on the cocaine offenses and to be followed by a 3-year term of
supervised release. (Ftnote. 5) (Ftnote. 5)
While petitioner was under indictment after his arrest, the Court of Appeals
disposed of his two codefendants' appeals. The court affirmed one conviction,
but reversed the other because the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ftnote. 6) Also after petitioner was taken into (Ftnote. 6)
custody, his attorney filed a "motion to vacate sentence and for resentencing,"
as well as a motion for judgment of acquittal. The District Court denied the
latter but granted the former, vacating the judgment previously entered on the
cocaine convictions. (Ftnote. 7) The District Court then resentenced petitioner (Ftnote. 7)
to a prison term of 15 years and 8 months, to be followed by a 5-year period of
supervised release. (Ftnote. 8) Petitioner filed a timely (Ftnote. 8)
____________________
5) App. 58-63. 5)
6) United States v. Mieres-Borges, 919 F. 2d 652 (CA 11 1990), cert. 6) _____________ _____________
denied, 499 U. S. ___ (1991). The difference in dispositions is explained by a
post-arrest statement admitted against only one defendant, 919 F. 2d., at
660-661, though the dissenting judge viewed the evidence as insufficient as to
both appealing defendants, id., at 663-664. Petitioner represents that he is ___
situated identically to the codefendant whose conviction was reversed, with
nothing in the record that would support a distinction between their cases. The
Government does not take issue with that representation, but maintains that the
evidence is sufficient to support all three convictions. Brief for United
States 28, n. 7.
7) App. 10. 7)
8) Id., at 51-56. 8) ___ 91-7749 - OPINION
ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES 5 ____
appeal from that final judgment. (Ftnote. 9) (Ftnote. 9)
On appeal, petitioner argued that the same insufficiency of the evidence
rationale underlying reversal of his codefendant's conviction should apply in
his case, because precisely the same evidence was admitted against the two
defendants. Without addressing the merits of this contention, the Government
moved to dismiss the appeal. The Government's motion was based entirely on the
fact that petitioner had become a fugitive after his conviction and before his
initial sentencing, so that "[u]nder the holding in Holmes, he cannot now ______
challenge his 1989 conviction for conspiracy and possession with intent to
distribute cocaine." (Ftnote. 10) In a per curiam order, the Court of Appeals (Ftnote. 10) __________
granted the motion to dismiss.
II
It has been settled for well over a century that an appellate court may
dismiss the appeal of a defendant who is a fugitive from justice during the
pendency of his appeal. The Supreme Court applied this rule for the first time
in Smith v. United States, 94 U. S. 97 (1876), to an escaped defendant who re- _____ _____________
mained at large when his petition arose before the Court. Under these circum-
stances, the Court explained, there could be no assurance that any judgment it
issued would prove enforceable. The Court concluded that it is "clearly within
our discretion
____________________
9) Id., at 57. This sequence of events makes petitioner's case somewhat 9) ___
unusual. Had the District Court denied petitioner's motion for resentencing,
petitioner would have been barred by applicable time limits from appealing his
initial sentence and judgment. Petitioner was able to file a timely appeal only
because the District Court granted his motion to resentence. Entry of the
second sentence and judgment, from which petitioner noticed his appeal, is
treated as the relevant "sentencing" for purposes of this opinion. We have no
occasion here to comment on the propriety of either the District Court's initial
decision to sentence in absentia, or its subsequent decision to resentence. __ ________
10) Id., at 70-71. 10) __ 91-7749 - OPINION
6 ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES ____
to refuse to hear a criminal case in error, unless the convicted party, suing
out the writ, is where he can be made to respond to any judgment we may render."
Ibid. On two subsequent occasions, we gave the same rationale for dismissals_____
based on the fugitive status of defendants while their cases were pending before
our Court. Bohanan v. Nebraska, 125 U. S. 692 (1887); Eisler v. United States, _______ ________ ______ _____________
338 U. S. 189 (1949). (Ftnote. 11) (Ftnote. 11)
Enforceability is not, however, the only explanation we have offered for the
fugitive dismissal rule. In Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U. S. 365, 366 (1970), ________ __________
we identified an additional justification for dismissal of an escaped prisoner's
pending appeal:
"No persuasive reason exists why this Court should proceed to adjudicate the
merits of a criminal case after the convicted defendant who has sought review
escapes from the restraints placed upon him pursuant to the conviction.
While such an escape does not strip the case of its character as an
adjudicable case or controversy, we believe it disentitles the defendant to
call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims."
As applied by this Court, then, the rule allowing dismissal of fugitives'
appeals has rested in part on enforceability concerns, and in part on a
"disentitlement" theory that construes a defendant's flight during the pendency
of his appeal as tantamount to waiver or abandonment.
____________________
11) The dissenting Justices in Eisler, noting that the case was not 11) ______
rendered moot by Eisler's escape, believed that the Court should have exercised
its discretion to decide the merits in light of the importance of the issue
presented. See 338 U. S., at 194 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id., at 195 ___
(Jackson, J., dissenting). In United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675 (1985), _____________ ______
despite the respondent's fugitive status, the Court declined to remand the case
to the Court of Appeals with directions to dismiss, and proceeded to decide the
merits. Id., at 681, n. 2. See also id., at 688 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring); ___ ___
id., at 721-723 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).___ 91-7749 - OPINION
ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES 7 ____
That ensuring enforceability is not the sole rationale for fugitive dismissals
is also evident from our review of state provisions regarding escaped prisoners'
pending appeals. In Allen v. Georgia, 166 U. S. 138 (1897), we upheld not only _____ _______
a state court's dismissal of a fugitive's appeal, but also its refusal to
reinstate the appeal after the defendant's recapture, when enforceability would
no longer be at issue. We followed Allen in Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U. S. 534 _____ _______ ________
(1975), upholding the constitutionality of a Texas statute providing for
automatic appellate dismissal when a defendant escapes during the pendency of
his appeal, unless the defendant voluntarily returns within 10 days. Although
the defendant in Estelle had been recaptured before his appeal was considered _______
and dismissed, resolving any enforceability problems, there were, we held, other
reasons for dismissal. Referring to our own dis-missal in Molinaro, supra, we ________ _____
found that the state statute served "similar ends . . . . It discourages the
felony of escape and encourages voluntary surrenders. It promotes the
efficient, dignified operation of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals." 420
U. S., at 537 (footnotes omitted).
Estelle went on to consider whether the Texas statute was irrational because _______
it applied only to prisoners with appeals pending when they fled custody.
Citing the "peculiar problems posed by escape of a prisoner during the ongoing
appellate process," id., at 542, n. 11, we concluded that it was not. The ___
distinct concerns implicated by an escape pending appeal justified a special
rule for such appeals:
"Texas was free to deal more severely with those who simultaneously invoked
the appellate process and escaped from its custody than with those who first
escaped from its custody, returned, and then invoked the appellate process
within the time permitted by law. While each class of prisoners sought to
escape, the first did so in the very midst of their invocation of the
appellate process, while the latter did so before 91-7749 - OPINION
8 ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES ____
returning to custody and commencing that process. If Texas is free to adopt
a policy which deters escapes by prisoners, as all of our cases make clear
that it is, it is likewise free to impose more severe sanctions on those
whose escape is reasonably calculated to disrupt the very appellate process
which they themselves have set in motion." Id., at 541-542. ___
Thus, our cases consistently and unequivocally approve dismissal as an
appropriate sanction when a prisoner is a fugitive during "the ongoing appellate
process." Moreover, this rule is amply supported by a number of justifications.
In addition to addressing the enforceability concerns identified in Smith v. _____
United States, 94 U. S. 97 (1876), and Bohanan v. Nebraska, 125 U. S. 692_____________ _______ _________
(1887), dismissal by an appellate court after a defendant has fled its
jurisdiction serves an important deterrent function and advances an interest in
efficient, dignified appellate practice. Estelle, 420 U. S., at 537. What _______
remains for our consideration is whether the same rationales support a rule
mandating dismissal of an appeal of a defendant who flees the jurisdiction of a
district court, and is recaptured before he invokes the jurisdiction of the
appellate tribunal.
III
In 1982, the Government persuaded the Eleventh Circuit that our reasoning in
Molinaro should be extended to the appeal of a "former fugitive," returned to________
custody prior to sentencing and notice of appeal. (Ftnote. 12) The Court of (Ftnote. 12)
____________________
12) For present purposes, the time of sentencing and the time of appeal may 12)
be treated together, as the two dates normally must occur within 10 days of one
another. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(b); see also n. 9, supra; Torres v. Oakland _____ ______ _______
Scavenger Co., 487 U. S. 312, 314-315 (1988) (discussing mandatory nature of_____________
Rule 4 time limits). Cases in which a defendant flees during that 10-day
interval will be resolved easily: if the defendant fails to file a timely
appeal, his case concludes; if the defendant's attorney files an appeal for him
in his absence, the appeal will be subject to dismissal under straightforward
application of Smith and Molinaro. Should a defendant flee after sentencing but _____ ________
return before appeal - in other words, should his period of fugitivity begin
after sentencing and end less than 10 days later - then a timely filed appeal
would be subject to the principles we apply today. 91-7749 - OPINION
ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES 9 ____
Appeals recognized in Holmes that all of the cases on which the Government ______
relied were distinguishable, "because each involved a defendant who fled after _____
filing a notice of appeal." 680 F. 2d, at 1373 (emphasis added). The court was
satisfied, however, that the disentitlement rationale of Molinaro "is equally ________
forceful whether the defendant flees before or after sentencing." 680 F. 2d, at
1374. The Eleventh Circuit also expressed concern that absent dismissal, the
Government might be prejudiced by delays in proceedings resulting from
presentencing escapes. (Ftnote. 13) (Ftnote. 13)
The rule of Holmes differs from that applied in Molinaro in three key ______ ________
respects. First, of course, the Holmes rule reaches defendants who flee while ______
their cases are before district courts, as well as those who flee while their
appeals are pending. Second, the Holmes rule, unlike the rule of Molinaro, will ______ ________
not mandate dismissal of an entire appeal whenever it is invoked. As the
Eleventh Circuit explained, because flight cannot fairly be construed as a
waiver of appeal from errors occurring after recapture, defendants who flee
presentencing retain their right to appeal sentencing errors, though they lose __________
the right to appeal their convictions. 680 F. 2d, at ___________
1373. (Ftnote. 14) Finally, (Ftnote. 14)
____________________
13) The court reasoned that the right of appeal, purely a creature of 13)
statute, may be waived by failure to file a timely notice of appeal "or by
abandonment through flight which may postpone filing the notice of appeal for
years after conviction." Holmes, 680 F. 2d, at 1373-1374. The court then ______
explained: "Such untimeliness would make a meaningful appeal impossible in many
cases. In case of a reversal, the government would obviously be prejudiced in
locating witnesses and retrying the case." Id., at 1374. ___
14) "We hold that a defendant who flees after conviction, but before 14)
sentencing, waives his right to appeal from the conviction unless he can
establish that his absence was due to matters completely beyond his control.
Such a defendant does not waive his right to appeal from any alleged errors___________________________________________________________________________
connected to his sentencing." Id., at 1373 (emphasis added).___________________________ ___ 91-7749 - OPINION
10 ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES ____
as announced in Holmes and applied in this case, the Eleventh Circuit rule ______
appears to call for automatic dismissal, rather than an exercise of discretion.
See n. 11, supra. _____
In our view, the rationales that supported dismissal in cases like Molinaro ________
and Estelle should not be extended as far as the Eleventh Circuit has taken _______
them. Our review of rules adopted by the courts of appeals in their supervisory
capacity is limited in scope, but it does demand that such rules represent
reasoned exercises of the courts' authority. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U. S. 140, ______ ___
146-148 (1985). Accordingly, the justifications we have advanced for allowing
appellate courts to dismiss pending fugitive appeals all assume some connection
between a defendant's fugitive status and the appellate process, sufficient to
make an appellate sanction a reasonable response. (Ftnote. 15) These justifica- (Ftnote. 15)
tions are necessarily attenuated when applied to a case in which both flight and
recapture occur while the case is pending before the district court, so that a
defendant's fugitive status at no time coincides with his appeal.
There is, for instance, no question but that dismissal of a former fugitive's
appeal cannot be justified by reference to the enforceability concerns that
animated Smith v. United States, 94 U. S. 97 (1876), and the cases that fol- _____ ______________
lowed. A defendant returned to custody before he invokes the appellate process
presents no risk of unenforceability;
____________________
15) The reasonableness standard of Thomas v. Arn, 474 U. S. 140 (1985), is 15) ______ ___
not, however, the only reason we require some connection between the appellate
process and an appellate sanction. As the dissent notes, post, at 3, n. 2, ____
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 47, which authorizes the promulgation of
rules by the courts of appeals, limits that authority to rules "governing [the]
practice" before those courts. 91-7749 - OPINION
ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES 11 ____
he is within control of the appellate court throughout the period of appeal and
issuance of judgment. Cf. United States v. Gordon, 538 F. 2d 914, 915 (CA1 _____________ ______
1976) (dismissing pending appeal of fugitive because it is "unlikely that [the]
convicted party will respond to an unfavorable decision").
Similarly, in many cases, the "efficient . . . operation" of the appellate
process, identified as an independent concern in Estelle, 420 U. S., at 537, _______
will not be advanced by dismissal of appeals filed after former fugitives are
recaptured. It is true that an escape may give rise to a "flurry of extraneous
matters," requiring that a court divert its attention from the merits of the
case before it. United States v. Puzzanghera, 820 F. 2d 25, 26 (CA1), cert. _______________ ___________
denied, 484 U. S. 900 (1987). The court put to this "additional trouble," 820
F. 2d, at 26, however, at least in the usual course of events, will be the court
before which the case is pending at the time of escape. When an appeal is filed
after recapture, the "flurry," along with any concomitant delay, likely will
exhaust itself well before the appellate tribunal enters the
picture. (Ftnote. 16) (Ftnote. 16)
Nor does dismissal of appeals filed after recapture
____________________
16) This case well illustrates the way in which preappeal flight may delay 16)
district court, but not appellate court, proceedings. Petitioner's sentencing
was scheduled for June 1989. Because he fled, however, and because the District
Court resentenced him upon his return to custody, his final sentence was not
entered until January 1991. Supra, at 3-4. Accordingly, petitioner's 11-month _____
period of fugitivity delayed culmination of the District Court proceedings by as ________
much as 19 months.
In the appellate court, on the other hand, the timing of proceedings was
unaffected by petitioner's flight. Had petitioner filed his notice of appeal
before he fled, of course, then the Court of Appeals might have been required to
reschedule an already docketed appeal, causing some delay. But here, petitioner
filed his notice of appeal only after he was returned to custody, and the Court
of Appeals was therefore free to docket his case pursuant to its regular
schedule and at its convenience. In short, a lapse of time that precedes
invocation of the appellate process does not translate, by itself, into delay
borne by the appellate court. 91-7749 - OPINION
12 ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES ____
operate to protect the "digni[ty]" of an appellate court. Cf. Estelle, 420 _______
U. S., at 537. It is often said that a fugitive "flouts" the authority of the
court by escaping, and that dismissal is an appropriate sanction for this act of
disrespect. See, e.g., United States v. DeValle, 894 F. 2d 133, 138 (CA5 ____ _ _____________ _______
1990); United States v. Persico, 853 F. 2d 134, 137-138 (CA2 1988); Ali v. Sims, _____________ _______ ___ ____
788 F. 2d 954, 958-959 (CA3 1986); United States v. London, 723 F. 2d 1538, 1539 _____________ ______
(CA11), cert. denied, 467 U. S. 1228 (1984). Indeed, the premise of Molinaro's ________
disentitlement theory is that "the fugitive from justice has demonstrated such
disrespect for the legal processes that he has no right to call upon the court
to adjudicate his claim." Ali v. Sims, 788 F. 2d, at 959; see Molinaro, 396 ___ ____ ________
U. S., at 366. We have no reason here to question the proposition that an
appellate court may employ dismissal as a sanction when a defendant's flight
operates as an affront to the dignity of the court's proceedings.
The problem in this case, of course, is that petitioner, who fled before
sentencing and was recaptured before appeal, flouted the authority of the
District Court, not the Court of Appeals. The contemptuous disrespect mani-
fested by his flight was directed at the District Court, before which his case
was pending during the entirety of his fugitive period. Therefore, under the
reasoning of the cases cited above, it is the District Court that has the
authority to defend its own dignity, by sanctioning an act of defiance that
occurred solely within its domain. See United States v. Anagnos, 853 F. 2d 1, 2 _____________ _______
(CA1 1988) (declining to follow Holmes because former fugitive's "misconduct was ______
in the district court, and should affect consequences in that court, not in
ours").
We cannot accept an expansion of this reasoning that would allow an appellate
court to sanction by dismissal any conduct that exhibited disrespect for any
aspect of the judicial system, even where such conduct has no connection to the
course of appellate proceedings. See supra, at _____ 91-7749 - OPINION
ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES 13 ____
10, and n. 15. Such a rule would sweep far too broadly, permitting, for
instance, this Court to dismiss a petition solely because the petitioner
absconded for a day during district court proceedings, or even because the
petitioner once violated a condition of parole or probation. None of our cases
calls for such a result, and we decline today to adopt such an
approach. (Ftnote. 17) Accordingly, to the extent that the Holmes rule rests on (Ftnote. 17) ______
the premise that Molinaro's disentitlement theory by itself justifies dismissal ________
of an appeal filed after a former fugitive is returned to custody, see 680
F. 2d, at 1374, it cannot be sustained.
Finally, Estelle's deterrence rationale, 420 U. S., at 537, offers little _______
support for the Eleventh Circuit rule. Once jurisdiction has vested in the
appellate court, as in Estelle, then any deterrent to escape must flow from _______
appellate consequences, and dismissal may be an appropriate sanction by which to
deter. Until that time, however, the district court is quite capable of
defending its own jurisdiction. While a case is pending before the district
court, flight can be deterred with the threat of a wide range of penalties
available to the district court judge. See Katz v. United States, 920 F. 2d ____ _____________
610, 613 (CA9 1990) (when defendant is before district court, "disentitlement
doctrine does not stand alone as a deterrence to escape").
Moreover, should this deterrent prove ineffective, and a defendant flee while
his case is before a district court,
____________________
17) Even the Eleventh Circuit, we note, seems unprepared to take such an 17)
extreme position. If appellate dismissal were indeed an appropriate sanction
for all acts of judicial defiance, then there would be no reason to exempt
sentencing errors from the scope of the Holmes rule. See 680 F. 2d, at 1373; ______
supra, at 9. Whether or not Holmes' distinction between appeals from sentencing_____ _______
errors and appeals from convictions is logically supportable, see United States _____________
v. Anagnos, 853 F. 2d 1, 2 (CA1 1988) (questioning logic of distinction), it _______
reflects an acknowledgement by the Eleventh Circuit that the sanction of
appellate dismissal should not be wielded indiscriminately as an all-purpose
weapon against defendant misconduct. 91-7749 - OPINION
14 ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES ____
the district court is well situated to impose an appropriate punishment. While
an appellate court has access only to the blunderbuss of dismissal, the district
court can tailor a more finely calibrated response. Most obviously, because
flight is a separate offense punishable under the Criminal Code, see nn. 3-4,
supra, the district court can impose a separate sentence that adequately_____
vindicates the public interest in deterring escape and safeguards the dignity of
the court. In this case, for instance, the District Court concluded that a term
of imprisonment of 21 months, followed by three years of supervised release,
would serve these purposes. (Ftnote. 18) If we assume that there is merit to (Ftnote. 18)
petitioner's appeal, then the Eleventh Circuit's dismissal is tantamount to an
additional punishment of 15 years for the same offense of flight. Cf. United ______
States v. Snow, 748 F. 2d 928 (CA4 1984). (Ftnote. 19) Our reasoning in (Ftnote. 19)______ ____
Molinaro surely does not compel that result.________
Indeed, as Justice Stewart noted in his dissenting opinion in Estelle v. _______
Dorrough, 420 U. S., at 544-545, punishment by appellate dismissal introduces an________
element of arbitrariness and irrationality into sentencing for
escape. (Ftnote. 20) Use of the dismissal sanction as, in practical (Ftnote. 20)
____________________
18) See supra, at 3-4. 18) _____
19) "The Court is not condoning [defendant's] flight from justice. 19)
However, it presumes his actions constitute an independent crime, i.e., `escape ____
from custody.' We refrain from punishing [defendant] twice by dismissing his
appeal." United States v. Snow, 748 F. 2d, at 930, n. 3. _____________ ____
20) "[T]he statute imposes totally irrational punishments upon those 20)
subject to its application. If an escaped felon has been convicted in violation
of law, the loss of his right to appeal results in his serving a sentence that
under law was erroneously imposed. If, on the other hand, his trial was free of
reversible error, the loss of his right to appeal results in no punishment at
all. And those whose appeals would have been reversed if their appeals had not
been dismissed serve totally disparate sentences, dependent not upon he
circumstances of their escape, but upon whatever sentences may have been meted
out under their invalid convictions." Estelle, 420 U. S., at 544. _______ 91-7749 - OPINION
ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES 15 ____
effect, a second punishment for a defendant's flight is almost certain to
produce the kind of disparity in sentencing that the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 (Ftnote. 21) and the Sentencing Guidelines were intended to (Ftnote. 21)
eliminate. (Ftnote. 22) (Ftnote. 22)
Accordingly, we conclude that while dismissal of an appeal pending while the
defendant is a fugitive may serve substantial interests, the same interests do
not support a rule of dismissal for all appeals filed by former fugitives,
returned to custody before invocation of the appellate system. Absent some
connection between a defendant's fugitive status and his appeal, as provided
when a defendant is at large during "the ongoing appellate process," Estelle, _______
420 U. S., at 542, n. 11, the justifications advanced for dismissal of
fugitives' pending appeals generally will not apply.
We do not ignore the possibility that some actions by a defendant, though they
occur while his case is before the district court, might have an impact on the
appellate process sufficient to warrant an appellate sanction. For that reason,
we do not hold that a court of appeals is entirely without authority to dismiss
an appeal because of fugitive status predating the appeal. For example, the
Eleventh Circuit, in formulating the Holmes rule, expressed concern that a long ______
escape, even if ended before sentencing and appeal, may so delay the onset of
appellate proceedings that the Government would be prejudiced in
____________________
21) 18 U. S. C. S3551, et seq., 28 U. S. C. SS 991-998. 21) _______
22) See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361 (1989) 22) _________ _____________
(discussing purpose of Sentencing Reform Act and Sentencing Guidelines).
The dissent relies heavily on the legitimate interests in avoiding the
"spectre of inconsistent judgments," as well as in preserving "precious
appellate resources." Post, at 4. It must be remembered, however, that the ____
reason appellate resources are precious is that they serve the purpose of
administering evenhanded justice. In this case, it is the dissent's proposed
disposition that would produce inconsistent judgments, as petitioner served a
15-year sentence while his codefendant's conviction was reversed for
insufficiency of evidence. 91-7749 - OPINION
16 ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES ____
locating witnesses and presenting evidence at retrial after a successful appeal.
Holmes, 680 F. 2d, at 1374; see also United States v. Persico, 853 F. 2d, at______ _____________ _______
137. We recognize that this problem might, in some instances, make dismissal an
appropriate response. In the class of appeals premised on insufficiency of the
evidence, however, in which petitioner's appeal falls, retrial is not permitted
in the event of reversal, and this type of prejudice to the Government will not
serve as a rationale for dismissal.
Similarly, a defendant's misconduct at the district court level might somehow
make "meaningful appeal impossible," Holmes, 680 F. 2d, at 1374, or otherwise ______
disrupt the appellate process so that an appellate sanction is reasonably
imposed. The appellate courts retain the authority to deal with such cases, or
classes of cases, (Ftnote. 23) as necessary. Here, for instance, petitioner's (Ftnote. 23)
flight prevented the Court of Appeals from consolidating his appeal with those
of his codefendants, which we assume would be its normal practice. See United ______
States v. Mieres-Borges, 919 F. 2d, at 654, n. 1 (noting that petitioner is______ _____________
absent and not party to appeal). If the Eleventh Circuit deems this consequence
of petitioner's flight a significant interference with the operation of its
appellate process, then, under the
____________________
23) We cannot agree with petitioner that the courts may only consider 23)
whether to dismiss the appeal of a former fugitive on an individual, case-
specific basis. Though dismissal of fugitive appeals is always discretionary,
in the sense that fugitivity does not "strip the case of its character as an
adjudicable case or controversy," Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U. S. 365, 366 ________ __________
(1970); see also n. 11, supra, appellate courts may exercise that discretion by _____
developing generally applicable rules to cover specific, recurring situations.
Indeed, this Court itself has formulated a general rule allowing for dismissal
of petitions that come before it while the petitioner is at large. See Smith v. _____
United States, 94 U. S. 97 (1876). The problem with the Holmes rule is not that_____________ ______
the appeals it reaches are subject to automatic dismissal, but that it reaches
too many appeals - including those of defendants whose former fugitive status in
no way affects the appellate process. 91-7749 - OPINION
ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES 17 ____
reasoning we employ today, a dismissal rule could properly be applied.
As this case reaches us, however, there is no reason to believe that the
Eleventh Circuit has made such a judgment. Application of the Holmes rule, as ______
formulated by the Eleventh Circuit thus far, does not require the kind of
connection between fugitivity and the appellate process that we hold necessary
today; instead, it may rest on nothing more than the faulty premise that any act
of judicial defiance, whether or not it affects the appellate process, is
punishable by appellate dismissal. See Holmes, 680 F. 2d, at 1374; supra, at ______ _____
13. Accordingly, that the Eleventh Circuit saw fit to dismiss this case under
Holmes does not by itself reflect a determination that dismissal would be______
appropriate under the narrower circumstances we now define.
Nor is there any indication in the record below - either in the Government's
motion to dismiss, or in the Eleventh Circuit's per curiam order - that __________
petitioner's former fugitivity was deemed to present an obstacle to orderly
appellate review. Thus, we have no reason to assume that the Eleventh Circuit
would consider the duplication of resources involved in hearing petitioner's
appeal separately from those of his codefendants - which can of course be
minimized by reliance on the earlier panel decision in United States v. Mieres- _____________ _______
Borges, supra, at 4, and n. 6 - sufficiently disruptive of the appellate process______ _____
that dismissal would be a reasonable response, on the facts of this case and
under the standard we announce today. We leave that determination to the Court
of Appeals on remand. (Ftnote. 24) (Ftnote. 24)
____________________
24) Neither the reasonableness standard of Thomas v. Arn, 474 U. S. 140 24) ______ ___
(1985), nor Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 47, mandates uniformity among
the circuits in their approach to fugitive dismissal rules. See Thomas, 474 ______
U. S., at 157 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). In other words, so long as all circuit
rules meet the threshold reasonableness requirement, in that they mandate
dismissal only when fugitivity has some connection to the appellate process,
they may vary considerably in their operation. For this additional reason, we
hesitate to decide as a general matter whether and under what circumstances
preappeal flight that leads to severance of codefendants' appeals will warrant
appellate dismissal, and instead leave that question to the various courts of
appeals. 91-7749 - OPINION
18 ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES ____
In short, when a defendant's flight and recapture occur before appeal, the
defendant's former fugitive status may well lack the kind of connection to the
appellate process that would justify an appellate sanction of dismissal. In
such cases, fugitivity while a case is pending before a district court, like
other contempts of court, is best sanctioned by the district court itself. The
contempt for the appellate process manifested by flight while a case is pending
on appeal remains subject to the rule of Molinaro. ________
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered. __________